Paul Ducklin talks to world-renowned cybersecurity professional Fraser Howard, Director of Analysis at SophosLabs, on this fascinating episode, recorded throughout our current Safety SOS Week 2022.
On the subject of combating cybercrime, Fraser really is a “specialist in all the things”, and he additionally has the knack of explaining this tough and treacherous topic in plain English.
[ROBOT VOICE: Sophos Security SOS]
PAUL DUCKLIN. Hi there, all people.
Welcome to the Sophos Safety SOS week.
At the moment’s matter is: Stopping cyber threats – cease them earlier than they cease you!
And our visitor right this moment is none aside from Mr. Fraser Howard, Director of Analysis at SophosLabs.
Now, these of you who’ve listened to SOS Week earlier than will know that I like to explain Fraser as a “specialist in all the things”, as a result of his information is not only broad, it is usually extremely deep.
He ticks each cell within the spreadsheet, you can say.
So, Fraser, welcome again to the SOS Week.
I needed to begin by specializing in one thing that goes by the title of LOLBIN, which I imagine is brief for “living-off-the-land binary”, which is jargon for software program that’s there already that the cooks love to make use of.
FRASER HOWARD. Precisely that.
DUCK. And the large downside in the intervening time appears to be that the almost definitely LOLBIN, or the almost definitely pre-installed program that the crooks will dine out on, for need of a greater phrase, is nothing aside from PowerShell, which is constructed into Home windows.
It’s accessible on each model of Home windows as quickly as you put in it.
And it’s the medium of administration nowadays for Home windows itself.
So how do you reside with out it?
FRASER. Precisely – similar to you described, from the attackers’ perspective, LOLBINs are sensible.
They both convey their very own knife to the struggle, and their knife would possibly look very totally different to all the things else that’s on the system…
…or they use a knife that simply occurs to be current on the system within the first place.
And that’s advantageous to the attacker, for apparent causes.
Any safety software program received’t see some model new, shiny, unknown utility instantly being run and utilized in a part of the assault.
However instruments like PowerShell are already there – that’s when the video games start by way of making an attempt to work out, “Is it one thing good, or is it one thing dangerous?”
I want there was a one-line reply to how we detect malicious PowerShell versus benign, however really it’s fairly a posh scenario.
What precisely is the PowerShell course of doing itself?
On one finish of the spectrum, you can use expertise like, for instance, utility management.
And as an admin, you can select: “PowerShell, you shouldn’t be allowed to run in my setting.”
That’s form of a panacea, if you happen to like, and it will cease PowerShell being abused, however it will additionally break numerous authentic exercise, together with the core administration of most Home windows machines right this moment.
DUCK. OK, so utility management is Sophos’s title for the flexibility to detect, and optionally to dam, software program that’s not malware, however {that a} well-informed administrator may not need to assist of their setting?
FRASER. Precisely.
And it’s not nearly admins and their alternative of “Which utility ought to my customers be allowed to make use of?”
It’s about fundamentals.
If you concentrate on safety, what’s one of many issues that we’ve been telling folks for the final 5 or 10 years?
“Patch!”
When you’re an administrator and also you’re permitting anyone to make use of no matter utility they need for his or her browser, that’s possibly 5 to 10 totally different browsers that it’s important to patch.
Truly, for admins, applied sciences like utility management allow them to slim that menace floor.
DUCK. However PowerShell… some folks say, “Oh, simply block PowerShell. Block all .PS1 recordsdata. Job performed.”
FRASER. It’s not fairly so simple as that!
DUCK. May a sysadmin handle with out PowerShell in a contemporary Home windows community?
FRASER. [PAUSE] No.
[LAUGHTER]
I imply, there are coverage choices that they may select to solely enable sure signed scripts, for instance, to be run.
However there’s a complete number of ideas and methods that the attackers know that attempt to bypass these mechanisms as nicely.
A few of the older scripting engines… the very best instance is Home windows Scripting Host – most individuals don’t realize it’s there.
It’s not the one-stop store for admin that PowerShell is, however WSCRIPT and CSCRIPT…
…these binaries, once more, are on each single Home windows field.
They’re much more possible to outright block, they usually get abused, once more by malware.
DUCK. So the Home windows Scripting Host contains issues like JavaScript (not working in your browser, exterior your browser), and good outdated Visible Fundamental Script?
FRASER. There’s a complete host of them.
DUCK. Now, Visible Fundamental script is discontinued by Microsoft, isn’t it?
Nevertheless it’s nonetheless supported and nonetheless very broadly used?
FRASER. It’s highly regarded with the Unhealthy Guys, sure.
And it’s not simply scripting engines.
I can’t keep in mind precisely what number of binaries are on a few of the primary LOLBIN lists which might be on the market.
With the correct mixture of switches, hastily, a binary that you simply would possibly use to handle, for instance, certificates regionally…
…really can be utilized to obtain any content material from a distant server, and put it aside to disk regionally.
DUCK. Is that CERTUTIL.EXE?
FRASER. Sure, CERTUTIL, for instance.
DUCK. As a result of that can be used to do issues like calculate file hashes.
FRASER. It could possibly be used to obtain, for instance, base64-encoded executable content material, put it aside regionally, and decode it.
After which that content material could possibly be run – as a method of probably getting by your internet gateways, for instance.
DUCK. And that will get even worse with PowerShell, doesn’t it?
As a result of you possibly can take a base64-encoded string and feed that into PowerShell because the enter script, and it’ll quietly decode it for you.
And you’ll even put in a command line choice, are you able to not, to say, “Hey, if the consumer stated ‘don’t enable scripts to execute from the command line’, ignore it – I want to override that”?
FRASER. You talked about .PS1 recordsdata.
That’s a bodily script file which may exist on disk.
Truly, PowerShell is fairly adept at doing issues filelessly, so simply the command line itself can comprise the whole lot of the PowerShell command.
DUCK. Now, my understanding is most so-called “fileless malware” does contain recordsdata, in all probability various recordsdata in its operation…
…however there shall be a key level at which one thing you would possibly detect *solely exists in reminiscence*.
So, safety software program that’s solely capable of monitor disk entry will miss out.
How do you take care of that form of scenario, the place the crooks have gotten all this semi-suspicious stuff, after which they’ve disguised the actually harmful bit with this fileless, memory-only trick?
How do you take care of that?
FRASER. One of many methods we take care of that, significantly with regard to PowerShell, is Microsoft supplies an interface which supplies us visibility into the behaviour of PowerShell.
So AMSI is an interface which distributors, safety distributors, can use to get a peep into malware.
DUCK. AMSI is… Anti-Malware Scanning Interface?
FRASER. Precisely.
It offers us a window into the behaviour of PowerShell at any time limit.
So, because it may be doing issues filelessly… any conventional interception factors that are in search of recordsdata on disk, they received’t be coming into play.
However the behaviour of PowerShell itself will generate exercise, if you happen to like, inside the AMSI interface, which supplies us the flexibility to recognise and block sure varieties of malicious PowerShell exercise.
The opposite factor is that, though “fileless” is seen as a little bit of a panacea for the dangerous guys…
…really, one of many issues that almost all attackers are after sooner or later is what we name persistence.
OK, they’ve received some code working on the machine… however what occurs if that machine is restarted?
And so their fileless malware usually will search to have add some degree of persistence.
So, a lot of the fileless assaults that we’ve seen really interact, usually with the Home windows Registry – they use the registry as a method of attaining persistence.
Sometimes, they put some type of BLOB [binary large object] of information within the registry, and modify some registry keys such that such that when that machine is restarted, that BLOB is decoded and malicious behaviour carries on once more.
At the moment’s merchandise are all about a complete vary of applied sciences, from easy, proper by to fairly terribly complicated.
DUCK. That additionally helps to elucidate why folks take recordsdata which might be kind-of the precursors of malware, however not overtly malicious themselves, add them to a web based service like, say, Virus Complete…
…and go, “Hey, no person detects this. All safety merchandise are ineffective.”
Nevertheless it doesn’t imply that file can spring into life and begin doing dangerous stuff with out getting stopped…
FRASER. That’s an excellent level.
I feel it’s one thing the safety trade has tried… however the truth that we nonetheless speak about it – we’ve in all probability didn’t get this level throughout:
What’s safety?
What can we really imply?
What does defending somebody in opposition to a menace usually imply?
Most individuals have a tendency to think about it like this… OK, they’ve a menace; they need a file that’s “the menace”; they usually need to see if that file will get detected.
However that specific assault… let’s suppose it’s a bot.
There may be 10,000 of these recordsdata *each single day*, because the dangerous guys flip their deal with and churn out numerous totally different replicas which might be basically all the identical fundamental factor.
And so the truth that 1, or 10, or 100 of these recordsdata will get detected…
…it doesn’t actually let you know very a lot about how nicely a product would possibly shield in opposition to that menace.
DUCK. “Bot” means software program robotic?.
Primarily, that’s one thing that sits in your pc usually, calling residence or polling some random server?
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. That server might change from daily… and the bot will often obtain an inventory of directions, resembling “Right here’s an inventory of electronic mail addresses to spam.”
Subsequent, it could possibly be, “Here’s a checklist of file extensions I would like you to scramble”, or it could possibly be “Activate the keylogger”?
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. Or “Take a screenshot proper now, they’re within the banking app”.
It’s basically an lively backdoor…
FRASER. It *is* a backdoor, sure.
And we spoke about backdoors 20 years in the past… I keep in mind doing buyer shows 20 years in the past, speaking about backdoors.
DUCK. “Again Orifice”, if you happen to keep in mind…
FRASER. Sure, sure!
We have been making an attempt to persuade clients that, really, a whole lot of the backdoors on the market have been extra vital than the high-profile malware of the day.
What you don’t need to get contaminated with are the backdoors, which permit some miscreant someplace the flexibility to manage your machine and do dangerous stuff, resembling take a look by your file system, or modify knowledge in your system.
That’s a much more horrifying menace than, for instance, a self-replicating worm that simply spreads from pc to pc.
That may get the press, and it would trigger issues in and in and of itself…
…however, really, someone accessing your system is arguably a a lot greater menace certainly.
DUCK. And pondering again to Again Orifice in… what was it 1999? 2000?
That famously it listened on port 13337, didn’t it?
FRASER. You’ve received reminiscence [LAUGHS]… sure, “elite”!
DUCK. And as quickly as folks began getting onto DSL connections at residence, and having a house router, Again Orifice was ineffective as a result of inbound connections didn’t work.
And so folks thought, “Oh, nicely, backdoors depend on inbound community connections – I’m protected by my ISP by default, so I don’t have to fret about it.”
However right this moment’s zombies, right this moment’s bots – they name residence utilizing some form of encrypted or secretive channel, they usually *obtain* the directions…
FRASER. And since it’s on HTTPS, they mainly disguise that community exercise amongst the million-and-one different internet packets that exit each minute on most residence connections.
DUCK. In order that’s one more reason why you need defence-in-depth or layered safety?
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Clearly, new recordsdata – you need to look at them; you don’t need to miss malware that you can have detected.
However the file could possibly be harmless in the intervening time, and it might become rogue after it’s loaded; after it’s manipulated itself in reminiscence; after it’s referred to as out and downloaded stuff…
FRASER. And so, to get again to the unique level: how we measure safety merchandise right this moment is extra complicated than it ever has been.
DUCK. As a result of some folks nonetheless have the concept, nicely, if you happen to actually need to take a look at a product, you simply get an enormous bucket filled with malware, all in recordsdata…
FRASER. Commmonly referred to as “a zoo”.
DUCK. …and you place that on a server in isolation someplace.
Then you definitely scan it with a static scanner, and also you learn the way many it detects, and that tells you the way the product behaves.
The “Virus Complete” method.
However that: [A] will are inclined to underestimate good merchandise, and [B] would possibly overestimate dangerous merchandise.
FRASER. Or merchandise that specialize in detecting recordsdata solely, for the aim of primarily trying good in these type of zoo-based checks.
That doesn’t translate to a product in the actual world that may really present good ranges of safety!
In actuality, we block recordsdata… after all we do – the file remains to be a vital forex, if you happen to like, by way of safety.
However there’s numerous different issues, for instance just like the AMSI interface that lets us block malicious PowerShell exercise, and a program’s behaviour itself.
So, inside our product, the behavioural engine seems on the behaviour of processes, community, site visitors, registry exercise…
…and that mixed image lets us spot probably malicious behaviour for the aim of blocking not essentially a particular household, or perhaps a specific form of form of menace, however simply *malicious exercise*.
If there are particular varieties of behaviour that we are able to decide are simply outright malicious, we’ll usually attempt to block that.
We are able to block a sure sort of malicious behaviour right this moment, after which a menace household that has not even but been written – in three months time, it would use that very same behaviour, and we’ll proactively detect it.
In order that’s the Holy Grail of what we do: proactive safety.
The flexibility for us to jot down one thing right this moment that sooner or later will efficiently block malicious behaviour.
DUCK. I suppose instance of that, to return to what we talked about earlier than, is CERTUTIL.EXE – that certificates validation utility.
You may be utilizing that in your individual scripts, in your individual sysadministration instruments, but there are some behaviours that you wouldn’t anticipate, though that program might be made to do these issues.
They’d stand out.
FRASER. They’d stand out, precisely.
DUCK. So you possibly can’t say, “This system is dangerous”, however sooner or later in its behaviour you possibly can go, “Aha, now it’s gone too far!”
FRASER. And that touches on one other attention-grabbing side of right this moment’s panorama.
Traditionally, EVIL.EXE runs; we’d detect the file; we’d detect some malicious behaviour; we clear it out of your system.
You spoke about LOLBINs… clearly, once we detect PowerShell doing one thing malicious, we don’t take away POWERSHELL.EXE from that system.
DUCK. “Ooh, I discovered Home windows doing one thing dangerous – wipe the entire system!”
[LAUGHTER]
FRASER. We mainly block that course of; we cease that course of doing what it was about to do; and we terminate it.
However PowerShell nonetheless exists on the bodily system.
Truly, right this moment’s attackers are very totally different from yesterday’s attackers as nicely.
At the moment’s attackers are all about having a purpose; having a function.
The outdated mannequin was extra spray-and-pray, if you happen to like.
If someone blocks the assault… dangerous luck, they provide up – there’s no human presence there.
If the assault works, knowledge is stolen, a machine turns into compromised, no matter it occurs to be, but when the assault was blocked, nothing else occurs on the system.
In right this moment’s assaults, there really is rather more of a human component.
So, usually, in a whole lot of assaults we see right this moment – that is typified by numerous the ransomware assaults, the place the crooks are particularly making an attempt to focus on sure organisations with their ransomware creations…
…when one thing is blocked, they fight once more, they usually carry on retrying.
As we’re blocking stuff, and blocking several types of malicious behaviour, there’s one thing behind the scenes; some *particular person* behind the scenes; some menace group behind the scenes, retrying.
DUCK. So 10 or 15 years in the past, it was, “Oh, we discovered this brand-new, beforehand unknown Phrase malware. We’ve deleted the file and cleaned it up, and we wrote it within the log”.
And everybody goes into the assembly, and ticks it off, and pats one another on the again, “Nice! Job performed! Prepared for subsequent month.”
FRASER. Now, it’s very totally different.
DUCK. At the moment, *that wasn’t the assault*.
FRASER. No!
DUCK. That was only a precusor, an “I’m wondering what model of smoke detectors they use?” form of take a look at.
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. And so they’re not planning on utilizing that malware.
They’re simply making an attempt to guess precisely what safety have you ever received?
What’s turned on; which directories are included; which directories are excluded out of your scanning; what ambient settings have you ever received?
FRASER. And what we speak about right this moment is lively adversaries.
Lively adversaries… they get numerous press.
That’s the idea of the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework – that’s is basically a bible, a dictionary, if you happen to like, of mixtures of techniques.
The techniques are the verticals; the horizontals are the methods.
I feel there are 14 techniques however I don’t know what number of methods… lots of?
DUCK. It may be a bit dizzying, that MITRE grid!
FRASER. It’s basically a dictionary of the several types of issues, the several types of approach, that could possibly be used on a system for good or dangerous, basically.
Nevertheless it’s basically aligned to attackers and lively adversaries.
When you like, it’s a taxonomy of what an lively adversary would possibly do when on the system.
DUCK. Proper, as a result of within the outdated days (you and I’ll keep in mind this, as a result of we each hung out writing complete malware descriptions, the form of issues that have been obligatory 15 or 20 years in the past – you have been speaking about EVIL.EXE)…
…as a result of most threats again then have been viruses, in different phrases they unfold themselves they usually have been self-contained.
As soon as we had it…
FRASER. …you can doc, A-to-Z, precisely what it did on the system.
DUCK. So a whole lot of malware again in these days, if you happen to have a look at how they hid themselves; how they went into reminiscence; polymorphism; all that stuff – a whole lot of them have been much more difficult to analyse that stuff right this moment.
However when you knew the way it labored, you knew what each technology might appear to be, and you can write an entire description.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Now, you simply can’t try this.
“Properly, this malware downloads another malware.”
What malware?
“I don’t know.”
FRASER. For instance, contemplate a easy loader: it runs; it periodically connects out.
The attacker has the flexibility to fireside in some type of encoded BLOB – for instance, let’s suppose it’s a DLL, a dynamic hyperlink library, a module… basically, some executable code.
So, “What does that menace do?”
Properly, it relies upon precisely and fully on what the attacker sends down the wire.
DUCK. And that might change day-to-day.
It might change by supply IP: “Are you in Germany? Are you in Sweden? Are you in Britain?”
FRASER. Oh, sure we see that very often.
DUCK. It might additionally say, “Hey, you already related, so we’ll feed you NOTEPAD or some harmless file subsequent time.”
FRASER. Sure.
The attackers usually may have methods they use to attempt to spot when it’s us [i.e. SophosLabs] making an attempt to run their creation.
In order that they don’t feed us what may be the final word payload.
They don’t need us to see the payload – they solely need victims to see that payload.
Generally issues simply exit quietly; generally they only run CALC, or NOTEPAD, or one thing clearly foolish; generally we’d get a impolite message popping up.
However usually they’ll attempt to hold again the final word payload, and reserve that for his or her victims.
DUCK. And that additionally means…
…I glibly used the phrase “polymorphism” earlier; that was quite common in viruses again within the day, the place each time the virus copied itself to a brand new file it will mainly permute its code, usually in a really difficult method, even rewriting its personal algorithm.
However you can get the engine that did the scrambling.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Now, the crooks hold that to themselves.
FRASER. That’s on a server someplace else.
DUCK. And so they’re turning the deal with within the background.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. And in addition you talked about loaders – folks might have heard of issues like BuerLoader, BazaarLoader, they’re type of well-known “model names”…
..in some circumstances, there are gangs of crooks, and that’s all they do.
They don’t write the malware that comes subsequent.
They simply say, “What would you want us to load? Give us the URL and we’ll inject it for you.”
FRASER. The unique bot operators from 15 or 20 years in the past – how did they generate income?
They compromised networks of machines – that’s basically what a botnet is, numerous machines beneath their command – after which they may mainly hire out that “community”.
It could possibly be for distributed denial of service – get all of those contaminated machines to hit one internet server for instance, and take out that internet server.
It could possibly be fairly generally for spam, as you’ve already talked about.
And so the pure evolution of that, in some sense, is right this moment’s loader.
If someone has a system contaminated with a loader, and that loader is asking residence, you basically have a bot.
You’ve the flexibility to run stuff on that machine…
…so, similar to you say, these cybercriminals don’t have to be involved with what the final word payload is.
Is it ransomware?
Is it knowledge theft?
They’ve a car… and ransomware is nearly the ultimate payout.
“We’ve performed all the things we needed to do.” (Or we failed in all the things else we have been hoping to do.)
“Let’s simply strive ransomware…”
DUCK. “We’ve logged all of the passwords now, there are not any extra to get.” [LAUGHS]
FRASER. There’s nowhere else to go!
DUCK. “We’ve stolen all the information.”
FRASER. Precisely… the ultimate cash-out is ransomware!
At that time, the consumer is conscious, and the directors conscious, there’s knowledge loss.
So, right this moment’s loader is nearly an extension of, an evolution of, yesterday’s bot.
DUCK. Fraser, I’m acutely aware of time…
So, given that you simply’ve painted an image that clearly requires full-time work, full-time understanding – you’re an professional researcher, you’ve been doing this for years.
Not all people may give up their day job in IT or sysadministration to have *one other* day job to be such as you within the organisation.
When you needed to give three easy ideas for what you need to do (or what you shouldn’t do) right this moment to take care of what’s a extra difficult, extra fragmented method of attacking from the crooks – one that provides us many extra planes on which we have to defend…
… what would these three issues be?
FRASER. That’s a troublesome query.
I feel the primary one needs to be: having consciousness and visibility into your organisation.
It sounds easy, however we very often see assaults the place the place to begin of an assault was an unprotected field.
So, you might have an organisation….
…they’ve a beautiful IT coverage; they’ve merchandise deployed throughout that community, correctly configured; they may have a group of individuals which might be looking ahead to all of the little sensors, and all the information getting back from these merchandise.
However they’ve a site controller that was unprotected, and the dangerous guys managed to get onto that.
After which, inside the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework, there’s one approach referred to as lateral motion…
…as soon as the attackes are on a field, they may proceed to attempt to laterally transfer from there throughout the organisation.
And that preliminary form of foothold offers them a degree from which they’ll try this.
So, visibility is the primary level.
DUCK. You additionally must know what you don’t know!
FRASER. Sure – having visibility into all of the gadgets in your community.
Quantity two is: configuration.
This can be a little bit of a thorny one, as a result of nobody likes to speak about insurance policies and configuration – it’s frankly fairly boring.
DUCK. It’s form of vital, although!
FRASER. Completely essential.
DUCK. “When you can’t measure it, you possibly can’t handle it,” because the outdated saying goes.
FRASER. I feel my one suggestion for that may be: if in any respect doable, use the really helpful defaults.
As quickly as you deviate away from really helpful defaults, you’re usually both turning stuff off (dangerous!), otherwise you’re excluding sure issues.
DUCK. Sure.
FRASER. For instance, excluding a specific folder.
Now, that may be completely acceptable – you might need some customized utility in it, some customized database utility the place you say, “I don’t need to scan recordsdata inside this specific folder.”
It’s not fairly so good if you happen to’re excluding, for instance, the Home windows folder!
DUCK. “Exclude C:*.* and all subdirectories.” [LAUGHS]
FRASER. It’s.
DUCK. You add one, you add one other, and you then don’t go and evaluation it…
…you find yourself the place you mainly have all of the doorways and all of the home windows propped open.
FRASER. It’s a bit like a firewall.
You block all the things; you poke just a few holes: high quality.
You retain on poking holes for subsequent three years, and earlier than the place you might be…
…you might have Swiss cheese as your firewall.
[LAUGHTER]
It’s not going to work!
So, configuration is basically vital, and, if in any respect doable persist with the defaults.
DUCK. Sure.
FRASER. Stick with defaults, as a result of… these really helpful defaults – they’re really helpful for a cause!
Inside our personal merchandise, for instance, if you deviate from defaults, very often you’ll get a pink bar warning that you simply’re mainly disabling safety.
DUCK. When you’re going to go off-piste, ensure you actually meant to!
FRASER. Ensure you have good visibility.
And I assume the third level, then, is: acknowledge the ability set required.
DUCK. Don’t be afraid to name for assist?
FRASER. Sure: Don’t be afraid to name for assist!
Safety is complicated.
We like to think about it’s easy: “What three issues can we do? What easy issues can we do?”
Truly, the truth is that right this moment’s safety may be very difficult.
Merchandise would possibly attempt to bundle that up in a reasonably easy method, and supply good ranges of safety and good ranges of visibility into several types of behaviour taking place in a community.
However if you happen to don’t have the ability set, or the useful resource for that matter, to work although the occasions which might be coming in and hitting your dashboard…
…discover somebody that does!
For instance, utilizing a managed service could make an enormous distinction to your safety, and it could simply take away that headache.
DUCK. That isn’t an admission of defeat, is it?
You’re not saying, “Oh, I can’t do it myself.”
FRASER. We’re speaking 24 x 7 x 365.
So, for somebody to try this in-house is an enormous enterprise.
And we’re additionally speaking about complicated knowledge – and we spoke about lively adversaries, and that type of assault.
We all know the Unhealthy Guys, even once we block stuff, will proceed to retry: they’ll change issues up.
A great group which might be taking a look at that knowledge will recognise that sort of behaviour, and they won’t solely know that one thing’s being blocked, these folks can even suppose, “OK, there’s someone repeatedly making an attempt to get in by that door.”
That’s fairly a helpful indicator to them, they usually’ll take motion, they usually’ll resolve the assault.
[PAUSE]
Three fairly good items of recommendation there!
DUCK. Wonderful, Fraser!
Thanks a lot, and thanks for sharing your expertise and your experience with us.
To all people who’s listening, thanks a lot.
And it stays now just for me to say: “Till subsequent time, keep safe.”
[MORSE CODE]
